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Abstract 
The work of Friedrich Von Hayek contains several testable predictions about the nature of market 
processes. Vernon Smith termed the most important one the ‘Hayek hypothesis’: equilibrium prices and 
the gains from trade can be achieved in the presence of diffuse, decentralized information, and in the 
absence of price-taking behavior and centralized market direction. Vernon Smith tested this by 
surveying data on laboratory experimental markets and found strong support. We repeat this exercise 
using field experimental market data. Using field experiments allows us to test several other predictions. 
Generally speaking, we find support for Hayek’s theories. 
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1. Introduction 
In an effort to test Hayek’s (1945) theories of the market process, Vernon Smith (1982) reviewed the 
(even by then) extensive laboratory evidence, concluding that “… in all three of the double auction 
environments studied experimentally… the evidence is consistent with the Hayek hypothesis,” (1982: 
p176). Smith went on to inquire: “… does this mean that it will do comparably well in the ‘field’ 
environment of the economy?,” noting that “few such field experiments have been attempted,” (1982: 
p177). Almost 30 years later, many such field experiments have indeed been attempted; this paper picks 
up where Smith (1982) left off and assesses how well Hayek’s theories travel in the field. 
The advantages of laboratory experimental data over naturally occurring data are well-documented 
(Falk and Heckman 2009). In the context of market experiments, the most important is the control that 
the laboratory affords the investigator, permitting him to induce demand and supply, and to have full 
knowledge of the predicted equilibrium. Field experiments complement their laboratory counterparts 
by, among other things, allowing the investigator to observe more diverse contexts and to limit the 
difficulties arising from inexperienced experimental subjects (see Harrison and List 2004 and Levitt and 
List 2007). 
Hayek (1945) provides several testable predictions about the market process.
2
 The most important, 
which Smith (1982) denoted the ‘Hayek hypothesis’, is that equilibrium prices and the gains from trade 
can be achieved in presence of diffuse, decentralized information
3
, and in the absence of price-taking 
behavior and centralized market direction. Critically, as Smith (1982) noted, these predictions are 
sometimes at odds with those of the neoclassical model.
4
 
We find that overall, Hayek’s theories are well supported by the field experimental data. However we 
also find that there are important exceptions that open the door to refinements of Hayek’s theories. For 
example in certain environments, the presence of experienced entrepreneurs and the dissemination of 
price information can hinder the equilibration process in markets. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is an overview of experimental methods. 
Section 3 briefly explores Hayek’s testable theories. Section 4 reviews the field experimental evidence 
on these theories. Section 5 concludes. 
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 The strictest presentation of Hayek’s theories precludes the testing of several of the predictions that we consider 
in this paper, e.g., arguably, according to Hayek it is impossible to know the competitive equilibrium in any market 
(experimental or otherwise). However following Smith (1982), we consider hybrid forms of Hayek’s theories that 
take advantage of the extra control afforded by experimental settings. We further discuss this issue below. 
3
 Formally, imperfect information and lack of common knowledge. 
4
 Perhaps more importantly, they apply in an environment where the neoclassical model typically fails to even 
articulate predictions due to Knightian uncertainty (Phelps 2006). Further, much of Hayek’s research has focused 
on price dynamics and the role of entrepreneurs in driving the market towards equilibrium. Partially due to the 
difficulties of tractably modeling price dynamics, neoclassical economics has provided a limited range of testable 
predictions in this area.  
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2. Experimental methods 
To fully comprehend the implications of field experimental data for Hayek’s theories, we need to lay out 
the exact advantages implied by experimental methods in general, as well as the relevant advantages of 
field experiments. For a full discussion of laboratory experiments, see Davis and Holt (1992) or Kagel and 
Roth (1997), and for field experiments, see Harrison and List (2004). 
A. Laboratory experiments 
As we will explain in the next section, Hayek’s market theories are only testable if the investigator has 
knowledge of: 
• The potential gains from trade 
• The prices that permit the gains from trade to be realized 
In other words, the investigator needs to know the demand and supply schedules, as well as the implied 
equilibrium price.
5
 In the absence of massive (and untestable) structural assumptions, this information is 
impossible to obtain from naturally occurring data. The laboratory allows the investigator to control 
preferences and costs and hence precisely induce the demand and supply schedules (Smith 1976, 1982). 
The investigator can also control (partially or completely): 
• The information available to market participants 
• The communication permissible between market participants 
• The contracts available to market participants 
• The horizons of interaction permissible between market participants 
B. Field experiments 
There are three types of field experiment which lie within a larger taxonomy (see Harrison and List 
(2004)). 
• Conventional lab experiment: a standard subject pool of students, abstract framing and an 
imposed set of rules 
• Artefactual field experiment: same as a conventional laboratory experiments but with a non-
standard subject pool, e.g., having general members of the population participate in a 
laboratory market 
• Framed field experiment: same as an artefactual field experiment but with a field context in 
either the commodity, task, or information that the subjects can use, e.g., having professional 
traders participate in a laboratory market that functions similarly to the market in which they 
normally operate 
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 In principle, some of the theories are testable without knowing the full schedules; however there is no doubt that 
a richer array of testing is permitted by knowledge of the demand and supply schedules. 
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• Natural field experiment: same as a framed field experiment but where the environment is the 
real environment where the subjects undertake these tasks, and where the subjects are not 
aware that they are in an experiment, e.g., performing an experiment in the New York Stock 
Exchange without the knowledge of the traders 
In the case of markets with induced (and hence known) demand and supply schedules, natural field 
experiments are impossible. Compared to the remaining field experiments, laboratory experiments 
potentially suffer from the following drawback (see Harrison and List 2004, Levitt and List 2007, Falk and 
Heckman 2009): subjects may be inexperienced in the task, and self-selection into the experiment may 
bias results. For example, the outcomes of a market may depend upon the inept traders having been 
whittled out, which is much less likely to have occurred in a laboratory experiment. As we will discuss 
below, this may be particularly important in the context of Hayek’s theories. 
An additional advantage of field experiments is the ability to consider longer-term issues such as 
reputation. When using students as subjects in an unnatural environment, reputational horizons rarely 
extend into months or years, in contrast to using subjects drawn from the natural environment being 
studied; field experiments extend the domain of analysis. 
Even setting aside these potential advantages of field experiments, it is useful to extend the domain of 
inquiry to as many different markets as possible purely as a standard act of robustness-checking. Most 
likely, this is what Smith (1982) had in mind when he posed the question about the generalizeability of 
the laboratory support for Hayek’s theory to field settings. 
3.Hayek’s testable theories 
Hayek (1940, 1967) argues against a model of behavior where agents’ preferences are determined 
separately from market processes; he believes that the process of competition is central to the manner 
in which agents assess how much they value commodities. At face value, this poses difficulties for 
deploying induced value theory (Smith 1976) in an experiment in an attempt to induce competitive 
equilibria. 
To overcome this, Smith (1982) relaxed some of the assumptions of the Hayek framework, noting that 
much of what Hayek proposed about markets applies in principle even if values and competitive 
equilibria can be induced. We follow Smith (1982) and thus the hypotheses that we present and test can 
be considered as (Vernon) Smithian interpretations of Hayek. 
Smith (1982) remarks that the standard proposition of decentralized market theory is that the gains 
from trade will be exhausted; further, prices will converge to the competitive equilibrium implied by the 
intersection of demand and supply. The divergence between Hayek and neoclassical scholars arises 
when one considers the conditions necessary for these outcomes, and the precise mechanism by which 
the competitive equilibrium is attained. 
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Hypothesis 1 (The Hayek hypothesis; Hayek 1945): The competitive equilibrium will be attained (and 
the gains from trade exhausted) even if: 
a) The number of traders is small 
b) Traders can act as price-setters 
c) Traders have extremely limited information about the conditions of the market, including 
complete ignorance of anything beyond their own preferences 
d) Traders may or may not have rational expectations (or common knowledge) over market 
conditions 
e) There is no centralized market orchestrator 
The standard competitive model adheres to some of these conditions at the expense of others. By 
having a central auctioneer (or some other deus ex machina) setting prices and a large (infinite) number 
of price-taking agents (violating conditions (a), (b) and (e)), the standard competitive model predicts 
competitive equilibrium despite agents having very limited information (satisfying conditions (c) and 
(d)). 
The bargaining literature that emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s (e.g., Rubinstein and Wolinsky 
1985, Wolinsky 1988, 1990, and Gale 1987) operated under the opposite configuration of conditions. 
There can be a small number of traders who set prices in a decentralized environment (satisfying 
conditions (a), (b) and (e)); however, subject to some minor imperfect information, the features of the 
environment are common knowledge (violating conditions (c) and (d)). Moreover the models in this 
bargaining literature rarely predicted competitive equilibrium and/or exhaustion of the gains of trade.
6,7
 
This was the hypothesis that Smith (1982) tested using laboratory data. Notice that it is impossible to 
test without knowledge of demand and supply (and hence the competitive equilibrium), hence the 
reliance on laboratory experimental data. Despite being aware of the following additional hypotheses, 
Smith (1982) did not test them, likely due to the unsuitability of laboratory (rather than field) 
experimental methods. 
For each of the following hypothesis, conditions (a) to (e) above apply. 
Hypothesis 2 (Hayek 1948, 1967): Entrepreneurs drive dynamics and equilibration; specifically, they 
move markets towards the competitive equilibrium and drive the realization of the gains from trade. 
Entrepreneurship is the alertness to a previously unrecognized opportunity for mutual gain (Kirzner 
1973). Mises (1949) operationalizes this definition by describing entrepreneurs as promoters and 
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 In some cases, as frictions (such as bargaining costs or positive discount rates) tended to zero, the model would 
predict efficiency. 
7
 The reliance upon rational expectations (specifically no Knightian uncertainty) is not necessarily an intellectually 
premise of these models; it is more of a modeling standard. In this paper, we purposefully avoid the debate over 
the desirability of rational expectations as a modeling standard (see Frydman 1982); our goal is simply to explore 
the hypotheses that are derivable from a Smith (1982) interpretation of Hayek’s work, which happens to not 
assume rational expectations, and to see how well they perform empirically. 
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speculators, eager to profit from discrepancies in the price structure. This should be contrasted with 
market participants who pursue final consumption (Kirzner 1997). 
An essential feature of the market process is that incompetent entrepreneurs are eliminated through 
evolutionary selection pressure (Kirzner 1997). The student subject pools that comprise the participants 
in laboratory markets are not recruited from any real market (or at least one that is sufficiently similar to 
the laboratory market in which they are about to participate). This is why field experiments are 
necessary for testing Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3 (Hayek 1948, 1945): The dissemination of price information pushes markets towards the 
competitive equilibrium and facilitates the realization of the gains from trade. 
Hypothesis 4 (Hayek 1948): Reputation is very effective at preventing asymmetric information from 
impeding the realization of gains from trade. 
As mentioned above, field experiments offer investigators a richer array of data for testing this 
hypothesis, especially since horizons longer than can be achieved in a typical laboratory experiment are 
sometimes required to overcome problems of asymmetric information. 
4. Field experimental evidence on Hayek’s theories 
All the market field experiments satisfy conditions (a) to (e) above. 
Result 1: Generally speaking, the competitive equilibrium is attained and the gains from trade are 
exhausted, i.e., the Hayek hypothesis is supported. 
The key studies are List (2004a) and List and Price (2006), though we will discuss some important 
counterexamples below. These are framed field experiments in two naturally-occurring trading 
environments: a sports card market and a pin collector’s market. 
In the sports card markets, the experiment departs from laboratory status by employing the following 
features. First, the commodity being traded was a baseball card (though market costs and values were 
induced in the usual manner; see Smith 1965). Second, the trading institution corresponded to real 
sports card markets: sellers would have individual, six-foot desks at which they would display their 
wares, and buyers would move around and would bargain multilaterally. Third, the participants were 
given roles in which they had real experience: buyers were experienced buyers and sellers were 
experienced sellers.
8
 Fourth, in addition to being experienced in their roles, traders had endogenously 
selected into their roles.  
To ensure adherence to conditions (a) to (e), the number of traders did not exceed 24. Some of the 
markets were symmetric ‘scissors’, while others were asymmetric and had either supply or demand as 
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 In sports card markets, the sellers are dealers: they rent tables in the exhibitions. Buyers are more casual 
participants, paying a small entrance fee and typically possessing less knowledge and experience in the market. 
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perfectly elastic at the equilibrium price. In List and Price (2006), some of the sessions had a smaller 
number of sellers than buyers, but each seller was selling multiple units (in all other sessions, each 
trader was looking to buy/sell exactly one unit). 
The pin collector’s markets were analogous subject to some simple differences. First, the traded 
commodity was a pin typically traded in that market. Second, the subject pool was dominated by 
women (in contrast to the male-dominated sports card markets). Third, the sessions had a smaller 
number of traders. 
Setting aside some important exceptions that we will discuss below, List (2004a) and List and Price 
(2006) generally found that prices converged to competitive equilibrium prices and that the gains from 
trade were largely realized. 
List (2004a) found that in sessions with inexperienced children acting as the traders, prices were less 
likely to be competitive and efficiency was lower. On the surface, this appears to contradict the Hayek 
hypothesis; yet closer inspection reveals the reverse. Hayek (1945) argued that a crucial component of 
market mechanism was the natural selection it imposed upon traders: poor traders would be eliminated 
and superior traders would survive (and thrive). When we restrict our attention to markets that have 
already selected out their poor performers, the Hayek hypothesis holds firm. Moreover, even within the 
sessions that involve endogenously selected roles and experience levels, List (2004a) found that more 
experienced traders tended to secure larger earnings. These results also highlight the benefits of 
complementing laboratory data with field data. 
Result 2: Entrepreneurs generally move markets towards the competitive equilibrium and drive the 
realization of the gains from trade. 
We can use experience and professionalism as proxies for being an entrepreneur, especially in light of 
the evolutionary selection pressures that Hayek argues are produced by markets. Consequently, several 
field experiments provide evidence for the hypothesis that entrepreneurs aid in the realization of the 
gains from trade. 
Loss-aversion and the endowment effect (Tversky and Kahneman 1991) are considered cognitive biases 
that potentially impede trade. They diminish the likelihood that sellers agree to sell goods that have 
been in their possession. This is particularly relevant given the emphasis that Hayek places on arbitrage 
in pushing markets towards equilibrium and in realizing the gains from trade. 
By conducting framed field experiments in sports card markets, List (2003, 2004b) demonstrated that, in 
line with standard results from laboratory experiments, inexperienced traders suffered from the 
endowment effect. More importantly, List (2003, 2004b) demonstrated that experienced traders 
suffered much less from the endowment effect (especially in the case of the goods they professionally 
traded), with the most expert traders not suffering from the endowment effect at all.
9
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 Given a negative correlation between experience and the endowment effect in naturally occurring data, one 
wonders whether this represents selection (traders who suffer from the endowment effect fail) or treatment 
8 
 
A recent and spectacular demonstration of market inefficiency has been the housing and asset bubbles 
associated with the financial crisis of 2007. In a series of laboratory experiments, Smith et al. (1988) 
studied asset markets and found that bubbles were a common occurrence. By recruiting subjects from 
the Chicago Board of Trade, Alevy et al. (2007) were able to conduct complementary framed field 
experiments in the spirit of List (2003, 2004b). They found that in addition to being less loss-averse than 
their inexperienced counterparts, professional traders were also less likely to form the cascades that 
generate bubbles. Bubbles still formed, but the presence of entrepreneurs clearly aided in the 
realization of competitive prices and securing the gains from trade. Haigh and List (2009) also found that 
professional traders are less loss-averse than inexperienced traders. 
The markets considered thus far are double auctions: both buyers and sellers can propose prices.
10
 
Conventional auctions are markets where only one side (usually occupied by a single trader) sets prices. 
As has been extensively demonstrated in laboratory experiments (see Thaler 1988), auctions with a 
common, uncertain value often result in the winner’s curse, i.e., the buyer paying an inefficiently large 
sum for the good, and hence a failure to realize the gains from trade. 
By conducting a series of framed field experiments using professional auction participants in a sports 
card market, Harrison and List (2008) were able to demonstrate that expert traders do not suffer from 
the winner’s curse even though inexperienced traders did. 
List and Price (2006) presents mixed evidence on the hypothesis that entrepreneurs push markets 
towards equilibrium (Hypothesis 2). It is again a framed field experiment in the vein of List (2004b), 
though the sellers (who are expert traders) are more concentrated than buyers: there are four sellers 
each trying to sell three units, vs. 12 buyers who are trying to purchase one unit each. Before the start of 
each session, the sellers are afforded the opportunity to gather privately and collude. 
The authors find that under certain conditions, the collusion among experienced traders is anti-
competitive, forcing the price above equilibrium and preventing efficient trade.
11
 This is evidence 
against Hypothesis 2. However having buyers who are experienced reverses this and lends support to 
the Hypothesis 2; the experienced buyers are able to successfully thwart the collusion by the 
experienced sellers. 
It is tempting to conclude that the pattern of results about experience and outcomes in List and Price 
(2006) is easily generaliseable, but List (2002) finds otherwise. Using market structures similar to those 
considered in List (2004a), but varying the experience of traders, List (2002) finds that trade and 
efficiency is highest when one side of the market contains experienced traders, and efficiency and trade 
is lowest when both sides of the market contain experienced traders. Thus there are important contexts 
where Hayek’s theories about the effect of entrepreneurs are not supported by the data. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(experience causally reduces the endowment effect). List (2003) investigates this using panel data and finds 
support for the treatment explanation. 
10
 The markets differ, however, in how widely and quickly the information about bids and offers diffuses. For 
example in List (2004a), only traders within earshot of the price-setter are aware of a bid/offer. 
11
 The specific condition is when trade prices are fully disclosed (rather than being noisily disclosed). We expand 
upon this below. 
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Result 3: There is some evidence that dissemination of price information can push markets towards 
away from competitive equilibrium and can impede the realization of the gains from trade. 
In the seller-concentrated, collusive markets of List and Price (2006), the authors considered two 
treatments: a baseline, where trade prices were disclosed to all sellers with complete accuracy, and a 
treatment where (collusive) sellers only received noisy signals about trade prices. As long as buyers were 
not too experienced (see Result 2 above), then perfect price revelation led to anti-competitive and 
inefficient prices (since it allowed sellers to monitor the behavior of cartel members), while noisy prices 
generated efficient outcomes. When buyers are experienced, treatment and baseline both deliver 
efficient outcomes. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the only field experiment in which an investigator has 
experimentally manipulated the dissemination of price information. Since the context is very narrow, we 
are cautious in generalizing the conclusion to other, more frequently-occurring contexts (such as those 
considered in List 2004a).
12
 
Result 4: There is mixed evidence on the ability of reputation to solve asymmetric information 
problems. 
List (2006) is a field experiment that exploits variation in the availability of third-party enforcement in 
sports card markets. Ungraded sports cards are collector’s items with uncertain quality. In some of the 
markets in which List (2006) collected data, costly third-party quality certification is available to sports 
card traders. As a result of their experience, professional sellers typically possess private information 
(compared to inexperienced buyers) about the quality of an ungraded sports card. This asymmetric 
information can potentially impeded efficient trade (Akerlof 1970). 
List (2006) created a field analogue to the trust game (Berg et al. 1995) by having buyers approach 
professional sellers and offer an experimentally controlled amount in exchange for an ungraded sports 
card. At the time of the purchase, quality is unobservable to the buyer, but if third party certification is 
available, the buyer can potentially verify quality after the completion of the transaction. For trade to be 
efficient, quality should be increasing in the price offered by the buyer. 
List found that when ex post third party verification was available, locally-based professional sellers 
responded to higher offers with higher quality cards. List demonstrated that this was the result of sellers 
fearing the adverse reputational consequences of selling poor-quality cards at a high price. Thus this 
part of the study supports Hypothesis 4. 
List was able to conclude that reputation was solving asymmetric information problems precisely 
because it was failing to do so for some traders. He found that prior to the availability of third party 
certification, professional sellers consistently sold low quality cards regardless of the price offered. 
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 In Chamberlin (1948), decentralized markets with limited diffusion of price and bid/offer information failed to 
converge to the competitive equilibrium. Smith (1962, 1965) did converge to the equilibrium principally because of 
the publicity of information on prices, bids and offers (the market institution was a double oral auction). In our 
opinion, this is a much more generalizeable context of the effect of transmitting additional price information. 
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Moreover following the introduction of third party certification, professional sellers who were not from 
the area (sports card exhibitions are national events with many local and non-local participants) 
continued to make quality unresponsive to price, further impeding efficient trade. 
Online retailers (such as eBay) have become a useful environment for running field experiments since 
researchers can pose as sellers without the formal apparatus required for conventional retail. Jin and 
Kato (2006) examine the effect of the eBay reputation system on sports card trading. Similar to the 
sports card conventions studied in List (2006), their environment is characterized by professional sellers 
who have private information about card quality that can be verified ex post using third party certifiers. 
The authors find that a seller’s online reputation (denoted by average ratings by buyers) is positively 
correlated with seller honesty; highly-rated sellers made less outlandish claims about unobserved 
quality. 
Resnick et al. (2006) demonstrated that eBay’s reputational system allowed highly-rated sellers to 
charge higher prices. They did this by having existing, highly-rated sellers sell their wares (vintage 
postcards) under new, low-reputation identities at the same time as under their regular identifies. 
Buyers’ willingness to pay was substantially higher under the high-reputation identity. 
Jin and Kato’s (2006) study also generated evidence against Hypothesis 4. Higher-rated sellers did 
indeed display lower probability of delivery and counterfeit delivery. However conditional on completed 
sales, higher-rated sellers did not attract higher bids by buyers, suggesting that the reputation system 
was insufficiently strong to make quality and price positively related (and hence solve problems of 
asymmetric information). 
5. Conclusion 
Viewed through Vernon Smith’s (1982) lens, Hayek’s theories yield multiple testable hypotheses, the 
most important of which is the ability of the market to deliver competitive prices and efficient outcomes 
despite price-setting, the presence of rampant, imperfect information and the absence of central market 
direction. Smith (1982) examined the laboratory evidence and found strong support for the Hayek 
hypothesis. 
Market field experiments are a complementary source of evidence that did not exist at the time of 
Smith’s review. A key advantage of field experiments is that they allow us to test a wider range of 
Hayek’s hypotheses, especially those that relate to the role of entrepreneurs and the effect of 
reputation. 
We find that in general, market field experiments support Hayek’s theories. Most significantly, and 
reassuringly given Smith’s (1982) findings, the Hayek hypothesis seems as robust in the field as it is in 
the laboratory. We also find multiple dimensions of evidence supporting Hayek’s proposition that 
entrepreneurs are a key force in driving markets to equilibrium and in realizing the gains from trade. 
11 
 
There is a rich tradition among neoclassical economists of studying price dynamics and the market 
process. Somewhat surprisingly, the theoretical literature of the last 30 years has paid little attention to 
Hayek’s theories, though undoubtedly this is at least partially a consequence of the difficulty of tractably 
formalizing them. Nevertheless we hope that in concert with Smith (1982), this study encourages 
theorists to re-examine Hayek’s theories. 
We also find that some of the field experimental data is less supportive of Hayek’s theories. There is 
evidence that reputation cannot alone solve problems of asymmetric information, and the (admittedly 
very narrow) evidence on the effect of disseminating price information poses questions of Hayek’s claim 
that it promotes efficient trade. 
In the case of the more weakly supported theories, are we to conclude that Hayek was simply wrong? 
Can his theories be refined in response to the findings? Perhaps the data presented are poor tests of 
Hayek’s theories, or they are unrepresentative of market processes in general. We leave these questions 
to future research. 
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